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THE TRUST AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A WILL
C. W.

LEAPHART

An examination of trust cases to determine the purposes for
which the trust has been, and is being, used, reveals an infinite
variety of such purposes. It is the purpose of this article to discuss its employment as a substitute for a will.
It is interesting to note in this connection that one of the very
important early functions of the use was to accomplish the devise
of land by will, a practice which the law had rigorously stamped
out.' In 1536 this scheme was curtailed 2 by the passage of the
Statute of Uses, 3 but the abolition of the power to devise by
means of the use aroused such hosfility that within four years
the power to devise freeholds was restored by the Statute of Wills
of

I 54o.4

As the result of that act and subsequent ones, it is, of

course no longer necessary to employ the use, or its successor,
the trust. There are, however, reasons other than that of evading
inheritance taxes 5 why a person may desire to dispense with a
will and yet provide that his property shall go to others than his
heirs or next of kin. In the first place, there are the formalities of
execution and the danger that the will may fail because they have
not been complied with. Furthermore, it is a matter'of common
knowledge that a will is never safe from attack on the ground of
incompetency of the testator at the time of the execution of the
will. The third and most important reason is the expense and
delay connected with the administration of estates.
As to the first point the advantages are with the trust. There
are no formalities connected with its creation. If another than
the creator of the trust is to be the trustee, the creator will have
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taxes and income taxes will be discussed in another article.

(626)

THE TRUST AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A WILL

to take the steps necessary to transfer title to the trust property.
If the creator is seeking to make himself trustee, any form of
words that will show his intention to hold in trust will be sufficient
in the case of personal property,6 while in the case of real property
there will have to be some written memorandum to satisfy the
prevailing Statute of Frauds.
As to the second point, just as in the case of wills, so in the
case of trusts, attacks are made upon the validity of the trust
because of the incompetency of the creator at the time of the
creation of the trust. Any comparison of the respective numbers
of the attacks would be valueless without a knowledge of the comparative number of trusts which are created in circumstances similar to those under which wills are executed. On this question the
books do not contain nearly so many cases dealing with trusts as
cases dealing with wills, but such attacks may well increase as the
'use of the trust device for this purpose increases.
As to the third and most important reason, the advantages
are again with the trust. The expense of administration of estates
varies with the state. That there is considerable expense and
delay in the settlement is a matter of such common knowledge
that we shall not attempt to cite any cases on the point. With
the trust device there need be no delay and in some instances no
expense at all, 7 while in others there is merely the trustee's fee.
The expenses are largely in the control of the creator.8 The trust
process is so clearly superior on this score that, especially in the
case of small estates, it may be well worth while to use the trust
if testamentary results can be obtained by it.
What can be accomplished by means of the trust that makes
it a satisfactory substitute for a will? First, the trust will be good
and will not fall within the scope of the laws governing wills
"There are many recent cases reiterating the proposition, in some of which
the court has gone to great lengths to find a trust. Morgan v. Hayward,
1I5 Miss. 354, 76 So. 262 (1917) ; In re Horkan's Estate, 198 Wis. 286, 214
N. W. 438 (1929); Neal v. Bryant, 291 Mo. 81, 235 S. W. 1075 (192i); Adamson v. Black Rock Power and Irrigation Co., 297 Fed. 9o5 (C. C. A. 9th,
1924); Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 24 F. (2d) 459 (E. D. Pa. 1927);
Sturgis v. Citizens Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (927).
"See the tentative trust cases discussed infra page 634 et seq.
'For figures see STEPHENsoN, LmNG TRuSTS (1926) 273 et seq.
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'when the grantor creates a trust with the beneficial interest in
himself for life, remainder over to another. 9 In such a case,
however, the grantor has created an estate in the remainderman
at the time of the declaration of the trust. In one sense it is like a
will, in that the remainderman comes into possession, in the lay
sense of the term, at the death of the creator of the trust. On the
other hand this disposition is not ambulatory. That the estate
vests in the transferee and the creator cannot, like a testator,
change his mind at any time before his death, is an elementary
proposition. 10
Suppose, however, that the creator reserves the power to revoke at any time before his death. The mere reservation of this
power will not make the instrument testamentary and therefore
subject to the statute." In fact the omission of such power has
caused voluntary settlements on trust to be set aside on the
ground of mistake.12 We now have a situation where the cestui's hold on the property is very little, if any, better than that
of the expectant devisee or legatee whose devisor has not yet died,
and the creator's power of changing his mind and undoing what
he has done is closely akin to the power of one who has framed
a will to revoke it.
But the creator may go further. Suppose he does not care
to revoke the trust in its entirety. He may not only reserve the
life interest and the power to revoke in whole, but he may also
reserve the power to alter or amend the trust,' 3 or the power to
recall either a part or the whole of the trust at any time, 1 4 or the
'In addition to cases cited in SCTr, CAsEs ON TRuSTS (1919) 2,5, n. I,
see McGillivray v. First National Bank of Dickinson, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N.
W. 15o (i928); Allen v. Hendrick, IO4 Ore. 202, 2o6 Pac. 733 (1922); National Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 Atl.
586 (1925).
'oPERRY, TRusTs (7th ed. 1929) § io4.
'The cases are collected in Scott, loc. cit. supra note 9. Most of the
cases subsequently discussed reiterate this.
Garnsley v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243 (1873).
'3Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1924);
Roche v. Bricldey, 254 Mass. 584, 15o N. E. 866 (1926) ; Allen v. Hendrick,

supra note 9.
' 4Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 13; Roche v. Brickley, supra
note 13; Allen v. Hendrick, supra note 9. In Keck v. McKinstry, 221 N. W.
851 (Iowa, 1928) the creator also reserved the right to appoint new trustees.
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power to change the beneficiaries. 15 He must, however, expressly
reserve the power to revoke in whole or in part, since the power
to revoke the entire trust does not carry with it the power to
revoke in part. 16 With respect to the power of revocation there
seems to be little reason for the distinction drawn in Warsco v.
Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co.7 between a case where the

creator has reserved the right to revoke in whole or in part and
where he has provided that the trustee shall on demand "pay
any . . . of the moneys . . . derived from the said certificate

of deposit" to the creator. In substance they are the same and
should be treated alike. The Wisconsin court considered such a
trust, however, testamentary. The situation is now one where the
creator may use as much of his property as he desires during his
life, the remainderman getting its practical enjoyment at his death.
The remainderman will have an estate of very little practical value
during the creator's life. It would rarely be salable becau se of
the strings attached to it. The creator, however, is perhaps not
so completely an owner as before, for he must, according to some
of the cases, be careful not to retain such control over the trustee
as to make him simply an agent.' 8 The test as to what constitutes enough control to make the device an agency is not, according to Jones v. Old Colony Trust Company,'" the same as that used
in determining whether a business organization is a business trust
or a joint stock company. It would apparently take more control
on the part of the creator to make it an agency than it would on
the part of the purported cestuis of a business trust to make the
latter a joint stock company. According to McEvoy v. Boston
Five Cent Savings Bank,20 however, the trustee's powers, in order
to create more than a mere agency relationship, must be more than
I Siter v. Hall,

220

Ky. 43, 294 S.

197 Mich. 21, 163 N. W. 497 (1917).

V. 767 (1927); Wilcox v. Hubbell,

"

ational Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, supra note 9.
I83 Wis. 156, i96 N. W. 829 (1924).
'McEvoy
v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E.
465 (igog); Stoddard v. Eaton, 22 F. (2d) 184 (D. Conn. 1927); Hale v.
.7

Joslin, 134 Mass. 310 (1883); Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 7 N. E. 720
(886) ; Stratton v. Athol Savings Bank, 213 Mass. 46, 99 N. E. 454 (1912);
Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass. 491, ioo N. E. 637
" Supra note 13, at 309, 146 N. E. at 717.
" Supra note i8.

(1913).
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simply to collect and pay over the trust fund in whole or in part to
the creator whenever and however he wants it. In Union Trust
Company v. Hawkins 21 the court considered the trust company
an agent, because all investments had to be submitted to and
approved by the creator, whose decision was to be final. The
court thought that this fact, plus the fact that on the death of the
creator all the trust property should pass to and become the property of her personal representatives, made the disposition testamentary. In Keck v. McKinistry 22 it was held rot fatal that
the creator reserved the actual management of the property during
his life, the trustee's active duties beginning on his death. In
Jones v. Old Colony Trust Company the trustee was to hold, manage, invest, and reinvest in its sole discretion, and to pay over the
fund to the intestate during her life, and at her decease to liquidate
or distribute it among numerous nained beneficiaries. The case
is distinguished from the McEvoy case in that the trustees had
ostensible control of the property. However, since the creator
may take back any portion or the whole of the property and may
alter or amend the terms of the trust, there is little doubt about
his ultimate control, for, if the trustee does not do as he says,
the settlor may revoke the trust and create a new one with compliant trustees. There is a suspicion that Jones v. Old Colony
Trust Company represents somewhat of a change in heart on the
23
part of the court. In Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and -TrustCo.,
in holding an attempted trust testamentary in which the creator
had transferred a certificate of deposit to the trustees upon trust,
with provisions that the trustee should pay over to him upon
request any of the money derived from the certificate of deposit,
without the consent of the remainderman, the court considered that
if the creator called for the money he would not be revoking the
purported trust, but merely requesting its enforcement, and that
with such a control the party named as trustee was simply an agent.
Bearing in mind these cases, and taking care to use the language
of revocation and to give the trustee some duties, it seems possible in most states to create a trust which will be in substance as
16I N. E. 548 (Ohio, 1927).

'Supra note

14.

'Supra note 17.
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ambulatory as a will, in that the creator will be able to do practically as he pleases with the property until the day of his death,
and prior to that time the remainderman has a vested right only
in form. On the creator's death he comes into enjoyment like the
beneficiary under a will.
McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank 24 has caused
some confusion. Upon casual inspection it may convey the idea
that there are limitations on the extent to which the power of
revocation may be used. In McGillivray v. FirstNational Bank 25
the court apparently so understood the case. But Jones v. Old
Colony Trust Co. 26 shows that it does not make the disposition

testamentary to reserve unlimited powers of revocation.
Another limitation is also suggested in the following
passage
7
from McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank: 2

"But if it be thought that this view of the construction
and necessary legal effect of the instrument is too favorable
to the claimant, the exceptions must be overruled on the
ground that the evidence justified a finding by the trial judge
that the paper was intended as a mere testamentary disposition of property, and not as a creation of a trust for any
other purpose, and that therefore there was no error of law
in the finding."
In Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., -s which, as we have noticed,
permits a trust revocable in whole or in part where the creator
retains a life interest, the court did not discuss this proposition;
but again in Roche v. Brickley,29 a case in which the creator left
no will and no property at death other than the property which had
been put in trust, this paragraph appears:
"The judge has found that there was no violation of the
statute of wills. The fact that 'the plaintiff conveyed only a
small portion of her property by the trust agreement' does
2

Supra note I8.
"Supra note 9, at 157, 217 N. W. at 153; also Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings
and Trust Co., supra note 17; Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, mtpra note 2L.
2GSupra note 13.
SSupra note i8, at 55, 87 N. E. at 466.
Supra note 13.
" Supra note 13, at 588, i5o N. E. at 868.
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not of itself establish that the conveyance was not testamentary and so not in violation of the statute of wills. A conveyance may be bad because of such violation, although it
does not dispose of all one's property. But taken in connection with other facts, especially that the gift takes effect on
the execution of the trust instrument, the fact that a small
part only of the donor's property is affected is persuasive that
the instrument is not testamentary. The first contention
fails."
If it is admitted that a trust may be created in which the
creator may reserve these rights, it seems foolish to try to set up
a rule that he shall not do it to "violate the statute of wills". Does
the court mean by this that he must not use the trust for the purpose
of getting the benefit of a testamentary disposition without making
a will? The Illinois Supreme Court is probably correct in Patterson v. McClenathan 30 in saying that most trusts in which a life
estate is reserved to the creator are undoubtedly created in order
to avoid making a will. It is hardly conceivable that Massachusetts
would consider such a trust testamentary and void unless it complied with the Statute of Wills, no matter what the motive of the
creator was. If it is conceded that trusts revocable in whole or in
part can be created, why should it make any difference that the
creator is using it in preference to leaving his property by will
because of the disadvantages of the latter method? If the policy
that surrounds the testator with safeguards of formality and the
probate court is applicable at all, it seems applicable in all cases
where the power to revoke is involved. In fact it would seem
applicable where the trust is for the creator for life, remainder
over on his death. 81 Suppose one of sound mind, believing that
he will die within a few days, should, in order to avoid the expenses of administration, make an outright, unconditional gift
of all his property after paying all his debts and providing for
burial expenses, etc. Would such a conveyance violate the Statute
of Wills? If not, the use of the trust, another well known method
of conveyancing of ancient lineage, should not be so treated just
W
296 Ill. 475, 129 N. E. 767 (192i).
8 Contra: Bogert, Recent Developments in the Law of Trusts (I929)

23

IL. L. Rnv. 749, at 757.
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because the creator intentionally uses that method in place of a
Svill in order to get many of the results that would be achieved
by a will.
There is no intimation in the statute of 1540,32 which restored

the power to devise freeholds, nor in any of its successors, that
they were designed to do away with trusts. If the spirit of these
acts is violated by trusts which are created to avoid making a
will or dying intestate, it is equally violated by outright gifts for
this purpose. The only thing to be said against the trust is that
it is much more efficient for this purpose, being more valuable in
that respect than a gift causa nortis in that it can be made without
reference to the near approach of death.
Having set up a device that is very effective for this purpose,
by deciding that a trust may be revoked in whole or in part, or
amended, altered, etc., it is absurd to say that it must not be used
for the very purpose that led to its creation and for which it is
well adapted.
Reverting to the case of Roche v. Brickley we find the court
saying that the creator's intention in creating the trust was to place
"her property in such a way that her husband would not share in
its distribution on her death." 33 In other words, she is using
the trust to get the advantages of a will without one of its disadvantages; namely, that if she left a will she could not deprive
her husband, of a share in the property disposed of therein. Though
she did this long before her death and at a time when she had
some property other than that which she put in trust, and therefore
probably did not make a conveyance in fraud of creditors, a more
likely case for finding that the settlor has created a trust in "violation of the statute of wills" is not likely to arise in Massachusetts.
While such a trust should not be condemned as testamentary,
it does not follow that the creator of the trust may accomplish all
that he sets out to do. For example, trusts which effect testamentary results do not thereby escape the Federal Estate Tax.84 At
"Supra note 4.
Supra note 13, at 586, i5o N. E. at 867.
See Reineke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123
(1927), where the testator reserved the power to revoke, alter, or amend
the trust, for the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject.
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first glance it might seem that the creator should not be able to use
it to deprive his wife or children of property of which he could
not deprive them by will. Since, however, he is allowed to do this
by gift, it seems logical that he should be able to do so by trust,
and so the court held in Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank,35
and likewise, with the spouses reversed, in Roche v. Brickley.3 6
Certainly he should not be able to use it to defraud creditors.
Query whether the creditors should not have been allowed to get
at the property in Roche v. Brickley, where the settlor created a
trust with all the necessary strings for pulling the property back
for her own enjoyment, and where at her death nothing was left
for her creditors. It is true that at its creation the court found
she had no creditors and had other property besides the portion
put in trust. The Roche case, when all the facts are considered,
indicates little likelihood that the trust will be declared bad for the
reason that it "violates the statute of wills".
Thus far cases have been discussed wherein the trustee is not
the creator of the trust. In such a case it appears that the only
safe thing to do is to give the trustee real duties to perform. It
remains to be seen how much further the process may go. Suppose the creator makes himself trustee with a beneficial interest
in himself for life and power to revoke the trust in whole or in
part. Will such a trust be testamentary? In this event the creator
would have all the powers that the creator retained in McEvoy
v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank,37 and the trust would logically
be held bad in Massachusetts. In McGillivray v. First National
Bank 3s the court, in refusing to find a trust on the slender evidence
in the case, was fortified in its decision by the fact that the grantor
would be also the trustee and could do everything she desired with
the deposits while she was alive. At least in one class of cases
many courts have gone that far, or perhaps somewhat further.
In bank deposit cases many courts have adopted the so-called "tentative trust doctrine". The court which first laid down the doctrine
stated it as follows:
'Supra note 6.
'Supra note 13.

'Supra note I8.

"Supra note 9.
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"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish
an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It
is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal
act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice
to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the
beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death
of the depositor." 39
Under this doctrine the depositor, without expressly reserving the
power to revoke, may draw out and use ag much of the deposit
for himself as he may choose during his life, and at his death
the beneficiary may draw out the balance. It seemed revolutionary at the time the decision was made, and it was criticized as
judicial legislation. In an article by Wilbur Larremore, 40 in which
such criticism was made, appears the following justification:
"On the other hand as a piece of constructive legislation
the decision could hardly be too highly praised. It effectuates
a custom which has grown up among the humbler class of
people who, in placing their money on deposit for other persons, often intend to retain the right to use it, principal as
well as interest, during life, but that whatever remains at the
time of death shall go to the cestuis que trust. Under the law
as it stood the estates of depositors, who as trustees had drawn
money from accounts, would be liable to refund the same
to the cestuis que trust. The validation of the business
custom in question seems so unobjectionable, indeed so desirable, that the writer has on various occasions advocated the
enactment of a statute on just the lines laid down in the
Matter of Totten. He did not believe that the court would
venture upon such a radical innovation and it is difficult to
justify it as an exercise of judicial power."
The desirability of the doctrine and the fact that the bankers favor
it have led to some legislation.
It is not an extreme step to imply a power to revoke. If the
'Matter

of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (19o4).
14 YALE L. J. 312, 315.

'Larremore, Judicial Legislation (i9o5)
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depositor intends a trust at all, it seems rather clear that he intends
a revocable trust. It is also true that he perhaps intends to "violate the statute of wills"; in other words, to escape the inconveniences of making a will and the consequent expenditure of
money in administering. But should that be fatal? The creator's
control of the property in such a case is absolute, and it may be
questioned whether it is justifiable to take the step taken by the
New York court. It is not likely that the state which decided
McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank 41 will take this view.
New Jersey, 42 Maine 43 and perhaps North Dakota 44 have dis47
approved of the doctrine. Minnesota, 45 Kentucky, 46 Maryland,
and probably California 48 approve the doctrine.
In Allen v. Hendrick " a father endorsed and delivered to
his son two time certificates of deposit made payable to the order
of the father. The following letter Wvas sent to the son: "Dear
Son: Will send two deposit checks you will keep safely for me
in case I come to need any part or all of them and if I never need
them they are yours when I am done with them." There was
other evidence that the grantor intended the son to have the
property when he died. The court thought this created a trust
revocable in whole or in part.- While the father's control here is
perhaps not so great as in the tentative trust case, it shows how
far the courts will go in giving effect to trusts which may work
as effective substitutes for wills.
Another method of using the trust to effect the same result
as a testamentary disposition of property was that successfully
"Supra note 18.
'Nicholas v. Parker, 71 N. J. Eq. 777, 61 AtI. 267 09o5). In Fiocchi v.
Smith, 97 At]. 283 (N. J. Eq. I916), the New Jersey court applied the New
York rule to a New York trust.
" Cazallus v. Ingraham, 1ig Maine 240, iO Atl. 359 (1926).
"McGillivray v. First National Bank, supra note 9,at 161, 217 N. W.
at 157; Eschen v. Steers, Io F. (2d) 739 (C.C. A. 8th, 1926).
'Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353 (i918), aff'd 143

Minn. 364, 173 N. W. 711 (1919).
"Schauberger v. Tafel, 202 Ky. 9, 258 S.W. 953 (924).

'7 Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 Atl. 43 (1899); Sturgis v. Citizens National Bank, supra note 6.
. Estate of Seiler, 176 Cal. 771, 170 Pac. 1138 (1917); rehearing denied,
176 Cal. 775, 179 Pac. 389 (1918).

"Supra note 9.
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taken in Milholland v. Whalen.5 0 The creator deposited money in
a bank in her own name "in trust for herself and Mary Whalen,
widow, joint owners, subject to the order of either; the balance
at the death of either to belong to the survivor". The bank book
was retained by her, and no notification was given to the co-cestui.
The depositor drew on the fund at different intervals. The court
-held that a valid trust was created, and, on the death of the depositor Mary Whalen got what remained of the fund. This case is an
interesting contrast to a preceding case in the same volume between the same parties, Whalen v. Milholland.r- The difference
was that in the preceding case the depositor, Elizabeth O'Neill,
made deposit as follows: "Elizabeth O'Neill and Mary Whalen.
Payable to the order of either or the survivor." Here since the
deposit was not made with apt words for creating a trust, the gift
failed because there was no delivery of the pass book. The use
of the words "in trust" or similar words is thus very essential
to successful results. For a similar case see McCullough v.
5"
Forrest.
If the tentative trust doctrine is to stand, should not an owner
of property be able to create a similar trust with reference
to any of it, making himself a trustee of the property for life with
ample powers of revocation reserved? Under such a trust his
power of control of his property is absolute. A perfect substitute
for a will is then found. The apparent objection is that this has
dispensed with all need of a will and laws governing the administration of estates. The answer to this, perhaps, is to let those who
desire their property safeguarded use the will, or die intestate
without creating a trust, and permit others who prefer the trust to
use it. Where the device contravenes some sound policy of the
law, let the legislature speak.
At present it is not clear whether the courts which approve
'the tentative trust doctrine would apply it to trusts of other kinds
of property. In Ambrosius v. Ambrosius,53 which went up to the
I'Supra note 47.

1189 Md. i99, 43 Ati. 45 (1899).
284 N. J. Eq. ioi, 92 Ati. 595 (1914). For a collection of cases on this
point see McGillivray v. First National Bank, supra note 9.
3239

Fed. 473 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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Circuit Court of Appeals from the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York eleven years after the Matter of Totten 54
was decided, an argument might have been made for the application of the tentative trust doctrine by analogy. According to the
facts stated in the opinion, a father had declared in writing that
he held certain listed securities in an envelope in trust for his
daughter during his lifetime. He continued to use the income
from the securities. On his death the envelope was found containing a portion of the securities listed, and others which had probably taken the place of listed ones which he had sold. The court
apparently did not consider the possibility of a trust with a life
interest in the creator, revocable as to the principal in whole or
in part, and thought such acts inconsistent with any idea of a
trust. The creator exercised no more dominion over the securities
than the depositor does in the bank deposit cases.
In conclusion, by means of a trust in which the power is
reserved in the creator to alter, amend, or revoke in whole or in
part, and to appoint new trustees, he may get that which for all
practical purposes is a testamentary disposition of his property.
He should be careful to give the trustees some rein in the management of the property, in order to be safe. In the light of such a
case as Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Company 5 the
creator will be wise to use language of revocation rather than to
direct the trustees to pay him on demand; and in view of Union
Trust Company v. Hawkins "I he should direct the trustee to convey the property on the creator's death to the remainderman, rather
than provide that on his death all his property shall pass to the
latter. It is submitted that such dispositions do not violate the
Statute of Wills, and there is very little likelihood that they will
be held to do so. With respect to trusts in which the creator is
also the trustee, the chances are stronger that the courts will treat
the disposition as testamentary. So far the tentative trust doctrine is just about holding its own. Whether it will be extended
to other forms of property remains to be seen.
"Supra note 39.
note 17.
'Supra note 21.

'Supra

